Awarding Price, Contract Performance, and Bids Screening: Evidence from Procurement Auctions
研究首次价格拍卖中低价中标与事后合同履行不佳之间的权衡，发现意大利公共工程采购中至少一半的成本节约因事后重新谈判而损失，而筛选最低价投标虽能防止履行恶化，但会减少初始成本节约并导致授标延迟。
This paper presents evidence on the perverse trade-off that first price auctions induce between low prices at the awarding stage and poor ex post performance when bids are not binding commitments. By exploiting the different timing with which first price auctions were introduced in Italy to procure public works, this study finds that at least half of the cost savings from lower winning prices are lost because of ex post renegotiation. Screening the lowest price bid for its responsiveness prevents performance worsening but also reduces the initial cost savings by a third and induces delays in awarding the contract.