Vertical Bargaining and Countervailing Power
研究上游供应商与多个差异化零售商之间的双边纳什谈判，发现谈判破裂时其他零售商的行为显著影响供应商的外部选择、投入品价格和福利，并重新审视了抵消买方力量假说。
We study a set of bilateral Nash bargaining problems between an upstream input supplier and several differentiated but competing retailers. If one bilateral bargain fails, the supplier can sell to the other retailers. We show that, in a disagreement, the other retailers' behavior has a dramatic impact on the supplier's outside options and, therefore, on input prices and welfare. We revisit the countervailing buyer power hypothesis and obtain results in stark contrast with previous findings, depending on the type of outside option. Our results apply, more generally, to the literature that incorporates negotiated input prices using bilateral Nash bargaining.