The Impacts of Contract Type on Broker Performance
研究了房地产经纪中独家代理和独家销售权两种合同，发现独家代理合同下房屋销售更快但价格略低，谈判时让步稍大。
This paper offers a theoretical and empirical analysis of the exclusive agency and exclusive‐right‐to‐sell contracts used in real estate brokerage. The theoretical model predicts that while both contract types will yield the same price, the exclusive agency contract will result in faster sales than the exclusive‐right‐to‐sell contract. In the empirical model, we find that houses sold faster under the exclusive agency contract than the exclusive‐right‐to‐sell contract. However, houses sold with exclusive agency contracts also sold at a marginally lower price. We also find a slightly greater concession from the listing price at the negotiation stage of exclusive agency listings.