Trading and Manipulation Around Seasoned Equity Offerings
研究增发前二级市场交易与发行定价的互动可能引发的操纵行为，模型预测增发前卖出增加导致做市商库存上升和价格暂时下跌，且操纵会隐藏信息，使价格波动中暂时性成分占比上升。
ABSTRACT We investigate the potential for manipulation due to the interaction between secondary market trading prior to a seasoned equity offering (SO) and the pricing of the offering. Informed traders acting strategically may attempt to manipulate offering prices by selling shares prior to the SO, and profit subsequently from lower prices in the offering. The model predicts increased selling prior to a SO, leading to increases in the market maker's inventory and temporary price decreases. Further, since manipulation conceals information, the ratio of temporary to permanent components of the price movements is predicted to increase.