An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information
利用1959-1969年美国外大陆架排水权租赁的联邦拍卖数据，实证检验了相邻企业比非相邻企业信息更充分、相邻企业协调投标、以及两类企业均按贝叶斯-纳什均衡模型策略投标的假设。
This paper examines federal auctions for drain age leases on the Outer Continental Shelf from 1959 to 1969. These are leases that are adjacent to tracts on which a deposit has been discovered. The authors find that the data strongly support the hypotheses that neighbor firms are better informed about the value of a lease than nonneighbor firms; that neighbor firms coordinate their bidding decisions; and that both types of firms bid strategically in accordance with the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium model for first-price, sealed-bid auctions with asymmetric information.