The Political Economy of Bad Data: Evidence from African Survey and Administrative Statistics
研究发现非洲多国官方统计数据系统性地夸大了发展进展，原因包括政府为获取援助资金而虚报，以及基层服务提供者因拨款规则改变而虚报数据，凸显数据系统与资金规则需激励相容。
Across multiple African countries, discrepancies between administrative data and independent household surveys suggest official statistics systematically exaggerate development progress. We provide evidence for two distinct explanations of these discrepancies. First, governments misreport to foreign donors, as in the case of a results-based aid programme rewarding reported vaccination rates. Second, national governments are themselves misled by frontline service providers, as in the case of primary education, where official enrolment numbers diverged from survey estimates after funding shifted from user fees to per pupil government grants. Both syndromes highlight the need for incentive compatibility between data systems and funding rules.