Lower Salaries and No Options? On the Optimal Structure of Executive Pay
校准标准委托代理模型发现，多数CEO不应持有股票期权，而应降低基本工资并增持公司股票，这样可在保持激励和效用不变的情况下将薪酬成本降低20%。
ABSTRACT We calibrate the standard principal–agent model with constant relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices to a sample of 598 U.S. CEOs. We show that this model predicts that most CEOs should not hold any stock options. Instead, CEOs should have lower base salaries and receive additional shares in their companies; many would be required to purchase additional stock in their companies. These contracts would reduce average compensation costs by 20% while providing the same incentives and the same utility to CEOs. We conclude that the standard principal–agent model typically used in the literature cannot rationalize observed contracts.