INFORMATION REVELATION IN A MARKET WITH PAIRWISE MEETINGS
构建了一个简单的配对交易模型，研究信息不对称下交易过程如何传递信息，发现即使在近似无摩擦的市场中，信息也不会完全揭示给不知情的交易者。
The paper presents a simple pairwise meetings model of trade. The new feature is that agents have asymmetric information about the true state of the world. The focus is on the transmission of the information through the process of trade. The qualitative questions is: to what extent is the information revealed to uninformed agents through the trading process, when the market is in some sense frictionless? In particular: does the decentralized process give rise to full revelation results as derived by the literature on rational expectations for centralized and competitive environments? In the context of the model of this paper, it turns out that the information is not fully revealed to uninformed agents, even when the market is in some sense approximately frictionless.