Exclusive contracts foster relationship‐specific investment
发现排他性合同可以鼓励合同双方进行关系专用性投资，结果取决于投资性质和谈判方案，且无限违约罚金可能导致过度投资，有限赔偿则能实现最优结果。
Exclusive contracts prohibit one or both parties from trading with anyone else. Contrary to earlier findings, we show that investments that are specific to the contracting parties may be encouraged by exclusivity. Results depend on the nature of investments and the bargaining solution. The major part of the analysis shows that exclusivity deals designed to “assure” the supply of essential inputs promote investment. Infinite penalties for breach, even if ex post renegotiable, may result in excessive investment, in which case a positive but finite damage payment yields the first‐best outcome.