Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
通过实验比较轮流报价和需求谈判两种立法谈判模型，发现实际行为对规则差异不如理论预测敏感，但比较静态结果与模型一致，且实验室数据与实地数据高度相似。
Alternating-offer and demand bargaining models of legislative bargaining make very different predictions in terms of both ex ante and ex post distribution of payoffs, as well as in the role of the order of play. The experiment shows that actual bargaining behavior is not as sensitive to the different bargaining rules as the theoretical point predictions, whereas the comparative statics are in line with both models. We compare our results to studies that attempt to distinguish between these two approaches using field data, finding strong similarities between the laboratory and field data regardless of the underlying bargaining process. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.