Implications of Economic Interdependence for Endogenous Wage Indexation Decisions
研究了经济相互依赖如何影响工资制定者的指数化决策，发现共同冲击下无影响，而特定国家冲击下相互依赖会降低指数化水平，且指数化决策可能成为战略互补或替代。
This paper shows how economic interdependence affects the indexation decisions of atomistic wage setters in an environment in which monetary authorities do not observe stochastic disturbances before making their policy choices. If stochastic disturbances are common across countries, interdependence has no effect on equilibrium indexation choices in identical countries. However, if disturbances are country specific, numerical simulations show that interdependence is likely to reduce equilibrium indexation choices relative to a small open economy. We also show that indexation choices may be either strategic complements or strategic substitutes, but that strategic complementarity becomes more likely as the degree of interdependence rises.