Business Networks, Corporate Governance, and Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry
分析共同基金行业中的商业网络如何影响董事会与基金管理公司之间的雇佣关系，发现双方基于过往互动强度相互优先雇佣，但未发现这种关系显著影响基金股东的利益。
ABSTRACT Business connections can mitigate agency conflicts by facilitating efficient information transfers, but can also be channels for inefficient favoritism. I analyze these two effects in the mutual fund industry and find that fund directors and advisory firms that manage the funds hire each other preferentially based on the intensity of their past interactions. I do not find evidence that stronger board‐advisor ties correspond to better or worse outcomes for fund shareholders. These results suggest that the two effects of board‐management connections on investor welfare—improved monitoring and increased potential for collusion—balance out in this setting.