Waiting to Imitate: On the Dynamic Pricing of Knowledge
研究发明者将可合法模仿的创新推向市场时，模仿者会等待进入，发明者通过合同允许转售知识，且潜在模仿者增多时发明者可能成为永久垄断者。
We study the problem of an inventor who brings to the market an innovation\nthat can be legally copied. Imitators may 'enter' the market by copying the\ninnovation at a cost or by buying from the inventor the knowledge necessary\nto reproduce and use the invention. The possibility of contracting affects the\nneed for patent protection. Our results reveal that: (i) Imitators wait to enter\nthe market and the inventor becomes a temporary monopolist; (ii) The\ninventor offers contracts which allow resale of the knowledge acquired by the\nimitators; (iii) As the pool of potential imitators grows large, the inventor may\nbecome a permanent monopolist.