Dividend Taxation and Corporate Governance
研究了2003年美国股息税改革如何通过降低个人股息税来抑制内部人留存收益建造帝国，同时保留机构投资者对管理层的监督压力，并分析该税制对美国大型独立持股公司结构的适宜性。
In 2003, the United States enacted a tax reform that reduced, but did not eliminate, individual dividend income taxes. Cutting the dividend tax deprives corporate insiders of a justification for retaining earnings to build unprofitable corporate empires. But not eliminating it entirely preserves an advantage for institutional investors, who can put pressure on underperforming managers. This balance is broadly appropriate in the United States—whose large companies are freestanding and widely held. In addition, preserving the existing tax on intercorporate dividends, in place since the Roosevelt era, discourages the pyramidal corporate groups commonplace in other countries, and preserves America's large corporate sector of free-standing widely held firms.