The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
通过实验室实验模拟了拥堵导致匹配过早的问题，并测试两种集中清算机制的效果，发现当错配成本高时实验结果与实地观察一致，并详细展示了市场从分散到集中的过渡过程。
We create an environment in which congestion forces agents to match inefficiently early. We then introduce one of two centralized clearinghouse mechanisms. One of these has been successfully used to halt this kind of unraveling in a number of labor markets, while the other has failed. When it is costly for firms and workers to be mismatched compared with the costs of matching early, the experimental observations reproduce the field observations. Furthermore, the experiment permits us to observe the transition between a decentralized and a centralized market, both when the centralized market fails to control unraveling and when it succeeds, at a level of detail unavailable in field data.