Resources at Marriage and Intrahousehold Allocation: Evidence from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and South Africa*
利用孟加拉国、埃塞俄比亚、印度尼西亚和南非的专门数据，检验家庭行为的统一模型与集体模型，发现统一模型被拒绝，但家庭是帕累托有效的；不同国家中，男女方的资产对教育支出的影响不同。
Abstract We test the unitary versus collective model of the household using specially designed data from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and South Africa. Human capital and individual assets at the time of marriage are used as proxy measures for bargaining power. In all four countries, we reject the unitary model as a description of household behaviour, but fail to reject the hypothesis that households are Pareto‐efficient. In Bangladesh and South Africa, women's assets increase expenditure shares on education, while in Ethiopia it is men's assets that have this effect. These increases have different implications for boys and girls across countries, however.