Insiders versus Outsiders in Monetary Policymaking
研究英国央行货币政策委员会内部成员与外部成员在投票决策上的差异，发现两者对通胀和产出缺口预测的反应无显著不同，但在截距、委员会经验和利率平滑参数上存在异质性。
This paper looks at the voting patterns of internal and external members of the MPC to investigate how far there are differences between insiders and outsiders. We make three contributions. First, we assess the extent to which the Bank of England internally generated forecasts explain the MPC members' voting decisions. This is important as generating forecasts on a quarterly basis is a key part of the process used by the Bank of England. The forecast for inflation is made public in the Inflation Report while the output gap forecast is not. Second, we use a random coefficient method of estimation in which the parameters of the interest rate rule are allowed, but not required, to be different across members. Third, we find evidence of some heterogeneity in the intercept, a measure of experience on the MPC and the interest rate smoothing parameter, but no significant differences in the members' reaction to the forecasts of inflation and the output gap. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)