Behavior in second-price auctions by highly experienced eBay buyers and sellers
研究高度经验丰富的eBay用户在密封第二价格拍卖中的行为，发现他们不像新手那样倾向于过度出价，但仍不按真实价值出价，且拍卖效率低于实验室实验。
Abstract We report on sealed-bid second-price auctions that we conducted on the Internet using subjects with substantial prior experience: they were highly experienced participants in eBay auctions. Unlike the novice bidders in previous (laboratory) experiments, the experienced bidders exhibited no greater tendency to overbid than to underbid. However, even subjects with substantial prior experience tended not to bid their values, suggesting that the non-optimal bidding of novice subjects is robust to substantial experience in non-experimental auctions. We found that auction revenue was not significantly different from the expected revenue the auction would generate if bidders bid their values. Auction efficiency, as measured by the percentage of surplus captured, was substantially lower in our SPAs than in previous laboratory experiments.