Experimenting and learning with localized direct communication
实验研究序列决策中玩家通过观察前一个人的选择和收益进行学习，发现均衡行为很少被完全遵守，并揭示了一致的实验偏好。
Abstract We report an experiment in which subjects may learn from each other. Specifically, a “queue” of players who are identically informed ex ante make decisions in sequence over two lotteries. Every player except the first in the queue observes (only) his immediate predecessor’s choice and payoff before making his own decision. In equilibrium decisions are identical from the first or second player onwards in all experimental conditions. However, complete adherence to equilibrium play is seldom observed in our experiment. We further analyze our data using a quantal response equilibrium approach and test for behavioral regularities related to base rate fallacy/conservatism bias, social conformity/rebelliousness, and preference for experimentation (preferring the lottery with potentially more information spillover value). Our estimations reveal a consistent preference for experimentation across conditions, and further analysis offers some support to our surmise that this behavioral regularity is due, in part, to an attempt to influence others behind in the queue.