International capital flows and credit market imperfections: A tale of two frictions
研究了有限责任与信息不对称两种摩擦如何相互作用，以及信息不对称如何影响存在责任约束时的投资效率，发现对封闭经济无影响的信贷摩擦在金融开放后会影响投资效率与配置，暗示全球失衡与金融危机的联系。
Financial markets in the real world are jointly characterized by some measure of limited liability and some degree of asymmetric information. Existing models are for the most part concerned either with asymmetric information or with limited liability, but not with their interaction. This paper seeks to fill this gap by asking two questions. First, how do these frictions complement one another? Second, how does the presence of asymmetric information affect the efficiency of investment in the presence of liability constraints? The answers to these questions are quite different when we constrast closed to open economies. In particular, credit market imperfections with no real effect in closed economy affect instead the efficiency and allocation of investment when countries become financially integrated with the rest of the world. These results hint to the possible connection between global imbalances and the financial crisis of