Generic Product Advertising, Spillovers, and Market Concentration
研究同质产品广告决策，发现广告不足的可能性取决于需求影响机制，且存在一个集中度下限，低于该下限即使广告能提高福利也不会发生；强制广告计划在促进进入时可提升福利，但生产者剩余可能下降。
Abstract We examine the decision to advertise a homogenous good. We show that the likelihood of inefficiently low advertising rests heavily on how one models the mechanism by which advertising affects demand. Regardless of this mechanism, however, there is always a lower bound of concentration below which no advertising occurs even when welfare‐enhancing. In such cases, mandatory programs will raise welfare if they induce entry, although producer surplus may decline. Our model also provides an explanation for the stylized fact that advertising intensity first rises and then falls as concentration increases.