Interactions Between Incentive Instruments: Contracts and Quality in Processing Tomatoes
利用加工番茄数据，检验价格激励对两种质量属性的互补性，发现一种属性下激励为替代关系，另一种下为互补关系，影响加工商利润最大化的激励工具选择。
Contracting and other forms of vertical coordination are important parts of the supply chains for many agricultural products. Often the buyer cares about multiple product attributes affected by a grower's actions. Using data that are insulated from common methodological problems, we test whether or not price incentives for two processing tomato quality attributes exhibit complementarity in improving delivered quality. Price incentives for the two attributes are substitutes for the provision of one and complements for the other. This finding has consequences for the profit‐maximizing choice of incentive instruments for processors, and contributes to the literature regarding tests for complementarities.