Does Equal Pay Legislation Reduce Labour Market Inequality?
通过一个带有歧视偏好的买方垄断竞争模型，研究同工同酬立法对劳动力市场不平等的影响，发现政策效果取决于歧视程度和竞争强度，有时反而加剧隔离和工资差距。
Abstract This paper considers a labour market model of monopsonistic competition with taste‐based discrimination against minority workers to study the effect of equal pay legislation on labour market inequality. When the taste for discrimination is small or competition is weak, the policy removes job segregation and the wage gap completely. However, with a bigger taste for discrimination or stronger competition, equal pay legislation leads to more job segregation, and sometimes minority workers end up earning less than before. Profits of discriminating firms might increase, and discrimination can persist in the long run, although it would have disappeared without the policy.