International Telecom Settlements: Gaming Incentives, Carrier Alliances and Pareto‐Superior Reform
研究了自由化国家中运营商利用转接策略与外国垄断者结盟，通过博弈规则减少支付并损害消费者，并提出一种双边结算改革方案消除博弈激励并惠及双方。
Liberalized countries that allow competition in international telecommunications favor traffic re‐routing practices as arbitrage against foreign monopolists. This view is seriously incomplete. Monopolists, allied with carriers in liberalized countries, can use these practices to reduce termination payments to nonalliance carriers??thereby harming also consumers in liberalized countries??by gaming regulations that require equal termination rates at both ends and ‘proportional return’ (the monopolist’s traffic is allocated among carriers in proportion to their shares of traffic to its country). We also present a simple bilateral settlements reform that eliminates gaming incentives and other proportional‐return distortions, yet benefits both countries.