Coalition Formation in a Legislative Voting Game
通过实验检验Jackson和Moselle的立法博弈模型，发现私人物品引入能促进立法妥协和提案通过，联盟形成更符合“效率均分”而非理论预测的子博弈完美均衡。
We experimentally investigate the Jackson and Moselle (2002) model where legislators bargain over policy proposals and the allocation of private goods. Key comparative static predictions of the model hold with the introduction of private goods, including “strange bedfellow” coalitions. Private goods help to secure legislative compromise and increase the likelihood of proposals passing, an outcome not predicted by the theory but a staple of the applied political economy literature. Coalition formation is better characterized by an “efficient equal split” between coalition partners than the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction, which has implications for stable political party formation.