Moral Hazard, Inspection Policy, and Food Safety
用委托代理模型分析抽样检验政策如何影响供应商的食品安全努力，并评估1996年美国《病原体减少/危害分析关键控制点法案》中的检验规定，认为规范抽样程序是改善食品安全的有效工具。
Abstract Buyers have imperfect information about the food safety efforts exerted by suppliers. To gather information about safety, buyers often employ sampling inspection. Sampling inspection exhibits sampling error so some unsafe product passes inspection and some safe product does not. This uncertainty influences buyer and supplier behavior. In this article, I use a principal‐agent model to examine how sampling inspection policies influence food safety. I use the model to examine the sampling inspection policies in the 1996 Pathogen Reduction/Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point Act. I conclude that the regulation of sampling inspection procedures is an effective tool for policy makers who wish to improve food safety.