Family Firms and Institutional Investors
研究发现机构投资者会避开家族企业，因为担心非控股股东利益被侵占；但金融监管能缓解这种担忧，对家族企业吸引资本有指导意义。
It is generally assumed that family firms emphasize socioemotional wealth, which exacerbates wealth expropriation from noncontrolling shareholders. We examine this issue in the context of nonfamily shareholders, specifically institutional investors, and find that institutional investors avoid investments in family firms. Furthermore, integrating institutional theory with a socioemotional wealth approach, we find that financial regulation can mitigate external investors’ concerns. These two results are important theoretically because they provide insight into the effect of agency problems specific to family firms and are important for management practice because they can provide guidance for family firms interested in new sources of capital.