Constitutional Rules of Exclusion in Jurisdiction Formation
提出四种宪法性准入规则（自由流动、多数投票、一致同意、公共品需求门槛），通过简单模型刻画均衡，并解释哪种规则会被选择，对研究移民政策和宪法设计的经济学者有参考价值。
The rules under which jurisdictions (nations, provinces) can deny immigration or expel residents are generally governed by a constitution, but there do not exist either positive or normative analyses to suggest what types of exclusion rules are best. We stylize this problem by suggesting four constitutional rules of admission: free mobility, admission by majority vote, admission by unanimous consent, admission by a demand threshold for public goods. In a simple model we characterize the equilibria that result from these rules, and provide a positive theory for which constitutional rules will be chosen.