独立董事会与偏好独立董事会的机构投资者:机构投资者治理偏好异质性的驱动因素

Independent boards and the institutional investors that prefer them: Drivers of institutional investor heterogeneity in governance preferences

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL · 2013
被引 69
人大 AFT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

研究发现机构投资者对独立董事会的偏好受交易策略影响,但共同基金因面临最强制度压力而偏好显著更强,表明偏好部分源于制度压力而非预期代理成本降低。

Abstract

Institutional investors report that they prefer to invest in firms with greater board independence despite the fact that researchers have been unable to demonstrate a link between board independence and firm performance. We investigate whether differences among institutional investors affect these preferences. We find that trading strategies have some effect but that mutual funds—facing the strongest institutional pressures—have significantly stronger preferences for firms with greater board independence than do other types of institutional investors. This suggests that institutional investor preferences for independent boards are at least partially driven by institutional pressures rather than anticipated reductions in agency costs . Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

公司治理机构投资者董事会独立性代理成本