Managing Competition in German Coal, 1893–1913
研究了莱茵-威斯特伐利亚煤炭辛迪加在第一次世界大战前的历史，说明卡特尔如何在成员众多、成本差异大、市场动态变化和外部竞争等压力下，不靠政府干预而维持二十多年。
The history of the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate before World War I demonstrates that a cartel can be established and maintained in the face of significant disintegrative forces, including many members, heterogeneous production and cost conditions, dynamic markets, competition from outside producers, and cheating. Opportunities for individualistic behavior, including contractual loopholes and horizontal combinations, combined with a collusive objective function that emphasized overall control and stability, allowed the cartel to survive for over two decades without government interference or support.