Public Opinion and Executive Compensation
研究1992-2008年间媒体对CEO薪酬的负面报道如何影响企业调整薪酬结构，发现负面报道后企业减少期权授予、增加工资，且声誉关注度高的企业反应更明显。
We investigate whether public opinion influences the level and structure of executive compensation. During 1992–2008, the negativity of press coverage of chief executive officer (CEO) pay varied significantly, with stock options being the most criticized pay component. We find that after more negative press coverage of CEO pay, firms reduce option grants and increase less contentious types of pay such as salary, although overall compensation does not change. The reduction in option pay after increased press negativity is more pronounced when firms, CEOs, and boards have stronger reputation concerns. Our within-firm, within-year identification shows the results cannot be explained by annual changes in accounting rules regarding executive compensation, stock market conditions, or pay mean reversion. This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, finance.