Collusion Through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment
检验上游研发合作是否导致下游合谋，发现直接竞争者之间的大型研发联合体网络会促进产品市场合谋，降低消费者福利。
Abstract This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We show that a sufficient condition for identifying collusive behavior is a decline in the market share of firms participating in research joint ventures (RJVs). Using information from the U.S. National Cooperation Research Act, we estimate a market share equation correcting for the endogeneity of RJV participation and R&D expenditures. We find robust evidence that large networks between direct competitors, created through firms being members in several RJVs at the same time, are conducive to collusive outcomes in the product market that reduce consumer welfare. By contrast, RJVs among noncompetitors are efficiency enhancing.