The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: A Dynamic Model with Information Production
构建了一个信息理论模型，解释内部人如何在IPO和二级市场出售股票，通过折价发行激励外部人生产信息，从而区分高价值与低价值公司。
ABSTRACT This paper presents an information‐theoretic model of IPO pricing in which insiders sell stock in both the IPO and the secondary market, have private information about their firm's prospects, and outsiders may engage in costly information production about the firm. High‐value firms, knowing they are going to pool with low‐value firms, induce outsiders to engage in information production by underpricing, which compensates outsiders for the cost of producing information. The information is reflected in the secondary market price of equity, giving a higher expected stock price for high‐value firms.