Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition: Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference and Framing
通过实验发现，被试对博弈形式的误解会导致测量偏好偏离真实偏好，表明选择数据不能无条件解释为偏好揭示，且框架理论可能掩盖这种错误。
This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects' misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified interpretation of preference revelation. Mistakes in choices obscured by a possible error at the foundation of the theory of framing can masquerade as having been produced by nonstandard preferences.