Does the Contribution of Corporate Cash Holdings and Dividends to Firm Value Depend on Governance? A Cross‐country Analysis
利用跨国数据检验代理理论，发现投资者保护较弱的国家中现金持有与企业价值的关系更弱，而股息与价值的关系在投资者保护更强的国家中更弱。
ABSTRACT Agency theories predict that the value of corporate cash holdings is less in countries with poor investor protection because of the greater ability of controlling shareholders to extract private benefits from cash holdings in such countries. Using various specifications of the valuation regressions of Fama and French (1998) , we find that the relation between cash holdings and firm value is much weaker in countries with poor investor protection than in other countries. In further support of the importance of agency theories, the relation between dividends and firm value is weaker in countries with stronger investor protection.