Patent Rights and Innovation Disclosure
研究最优专利如何影响企业披露创新的时机，发现弱化专利权可能通过减少竞争使企业推迟专利申请，从而带来高达46%的福利提升。
This article studies optimal patents with respect to the timing of innovation disclosure. In a simple model, we identify forces that lead firms to either suboptimally patent too early or too late in equilibrium, and we determine conditions so that stronger patents induce earlier or later equilibrium disclosure. Then, by solving an infinite multistage patent game with a more explicit structure, we describe innovation growth, and derive detailed predictions that can be used for policy experiments. As an application, we calibrate our multistage game using summary statistics from the seeds breeding industry. We find that weaker patent rights may result in welfare gains of 46% relative to the status quo. The gains are achieved because weaker patents reduce competition, thus leading firms to postpone patenting.