Dominant CEO, Deviant Strategy, and Extreme Performance: The Moderating Role of a Powerful Board
研究强势CEO（相对高管团队其他成员权力很大）对企业战略和绩效的影响，发现这类CEO倾向于采取偏离行业常规的战略，导致极端绩效（大赢或大亏），而强势董事会能削弱这种极端倾向并增加大赢的概率。
abstract This study examines the effect of dominant CEOs – defined as CEOs who are very powerful relative to other executives in their top management teams – on firm strategy and performance. Based on a sample of 51 publicly traded, single‐business firms from the US computer industry for the period 1997–2003, our results suggest that firms with dominant CEOs tend to have a strategy deviant from the industry central tendency and thus extreme performance – either big wins or big losses. Further, powerful boards weaken the tendency of dominant CEOs towards extremeness and, more important, improve the likelihood of dominant CEOs having big wins versus big losses. This study reconciles the pessimistic and heroic views regarding dominant CEOs, and suggests that the notion of power balance should be considered in a broader context.