Venture Capital Conflicts of Interest: Evidence from Acquisitions of Venture-Backed Firms
研究发现风险投资支持的企业被收购时，收购方公告回报平均高出3%，并揭示风险投资与收购方或目标方的财务关联、企业风险投资的战略主导以及基金临近到期时的清算压力是利益冲突的来源。
Abstract We analyze the effects of venture capital (VC) backing on profitability of private firm acquisitions. We find that VC backing leads to significantly higher acquirer announcement returns, averaging 3%, even after controlling for deal characteristics and endogeneity of venture funding. This leads us to investigate whether some VCs have interests that conflict with those of other investors. We show that such conflicts arise from VCs having financial relationships with both acquirers and targets, corporate VCs having a dominant strategic focus, and VC funds nearing maturity experiencing pressure to liquidate. Our conclusions follow from examinations of target takeover premia and acquirer announcement returns.