The Welfare Implications of Costly Monitoring in the Credit Market
构建了一个包含隐藏信息和昂贵监督的信贷配给一般均衡模型，发现信贷配给虽然次优，但应比实际更紧，因为均衡时借款人承担平均监督成本，而效率要求承担更高的边际监督成本。
Rationing is a pervasive feature of credit markets. It has been suggested that credit rationing represents a sub-optimal allocation of resources. In a general equilibrium model of credit rationing with hidden information and costly monitoring we show that if credit is rationed it is sub-optimal but that credit should be rationed more tightly. In equilibrium loan applicants bear average monitoring costs, whereas for efficiency they should bear marginal monitoring costs which are larger because average monitoring costs increase with quantity as extra loans are accompanied by a rise in the interest rate which increases the number of defaults.