The Use of Incentive Compensation Among Board Members in Family Firms
研究家族企业内家族与非家族董事的薪酬差异，发现家族董事的变动薪酬占比和总薪酬均低于非家族董事，且家族所有权集中度和董事会中家族成员比例高会减少对家族董事的激励薪酬使用。
Although previous literature has focused on managerial compensation differences between family and non-family firms, the examination of differences in the compensation structure of family directors versus their non-family counterparts within family firms has received much less attention. We analyze several contingencies related to directors’ kinship ties to the owning family that may influence directors’ total compensation levels and their incentive compensation in family firms. The empirical evidence is provided by a sample of publicly listed family firms from the United States. Our results show that family-member directors receive a lower share of variable pay and a lower level of total compensation than non-family directors within the same firm. In addition, a high family ownership concentration and a large proportion of family members on the board impact negatively on the use of incentive compensation among board members with kinship ties to the owning family.