Access Pricing under Competition: An Application to Cellular Networks
研究上游企业竞争时下游市场需要接入这些客户的新接入定价问题，以固定电话到蜂窝电话呼叫为例，发现蜂窝公司竞争导致接入价格设定在垄断水平或更高，并应用于长途电话终止和支付系统交换费设定。
A new class of access pricing problems is analyzed in which upstream firms compete for customers and access to these customers is required by downstream markets. Using fixed–to–cellular calls as an example, a model is presented which shows that the determination of cellular termination charges is quite different to standard access pricing problems. Competition between cellular firms leads to access prices being set either at, or above, the monopoly level. Applications are given for other market settings, including the termination of long–distance calls on competing local exchange networks and the setting of interchange fees in payment systems.