Renegotiation of Listing Contracts, Seller Opportunism and Efficiency: An Economic Analysis
研究了房产卖方在挂牌合同到期前重新谈判降低佣金的机会主义行为，从效率角度认为法院应支持此类重新谈判，因为经纪人与卖方之间的交易成本通常较低。
When a property owner engages a real estate broker to sell his or her property, the parties enter into a listing contract which entitles the broker to a commission if a ready, willing and able buyer is found before the contract expires. While a limit on the duration of the contract provides the broker with an incentive to work hard to find a buyer, it also creates the potential for seller opportunism. In particular, sellers have an incentive to renegotiate a lower commission as the end of the contract approaches. The paper concludes that, from an efficiency perspective, courts should generally enforce such renegotiations, given that transaction costs between brokers and sellers are ordinarily low.