VERTICAL RELATIONS UNDER CREDIT CONSTRAINTS
研究了信贷约束和市场风险如何影响供应链中企业间的纵向关系，发现信贷约束企业内生风险厌恶导致最优供应合同包含风险分担，引发双重边际化和更高零售价格，并解释了供应商金融部门的存在及货币政策传导机制。
We model the impact credit constraints and market risk have on the vertical relationships between firms in the supply chain. As credit-constrained firms become endogenously risk averse, the optimal supply contract contract involves risk sharing, thereby inducing double marginalization and higher retail prices. The model gives rise to a new motive for outsourcing supply (or distribution). We identify an intrinsic complementarity between supply and lending, which can help explain the existence of finance arms of major suppliers, and a novel monetary transmission mechanism linking interest rates with short-run pricing that can help explain the price puzzle in macroeconomics.