How Do Land Auction Formats Influence the Market Structure and Aggregate Surplus of Real Estate Development?
研究密封第一价格拍卖与公开英式拍卖对房地产开发市场结构和总剩余的影响，发现密封拍卖促进竞争而英式拍卖导致垄断，建议政府公开历史投标信息以提高总剩余。
This article proposes a duopoly dynamic game theoretic model to investigate the market structure and aggregate surplus of real estate development when land is sold in a sealed‐bid first price auction vis‐à‐vis an open English auction. It relaxes the assumption of symmetric bidders. The land values have common value and private value components. We find that the sealed‐bid first price auction introduces competition in the real estate development market. The open English auction leads a monopoly market. State agencies are recommended to increase the aggregate surplus of real estate development by publishing past bidding information under the sealed‐bid first price auction and reducing information asymmetry between bidders.