Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions
研究银行等金融机构设立两个子公司分别发放不同风险贷款（如好银行/坏银行结构）如何防止风险转移，减少对债权人的剥削，并比较了双元结构与一元结构的优劣条件。
ABSTRACT Banks and related financial institutions often have two separate subsidiaries that make loans of similar type but differing risk, for example, a bank and a finance company, or a “good bank/bad bank” structure. Such “bipartite” structures may prevent risk shifting, in which banks misuse their flexibility in choosing and monitoring loans to exploit their debt holders. By “insulating” safer loans from riskier loans, a bipartite structure reduces risk‐shifting incentives in the safer subsidiary. Bipartite structures are more likely to dominate unitary structures as the downside from riskier loans is higher or as expected profits from the efficient loan mix are lower.