Relationship Banking, Fragility, and the Asset-Liability Matching Problem
研究为何关系贷款银行主要用核心存款融资，而非购买资金。关系贷款信息不透明且流动性差，但需要银行与借款人保持长期关系才能增值。核心存款因提供流动性服务，减少提前取款风险，从而维持关系贷款的连续性，并最小化银行脆弱性。
We address a fundamental question in relationship banking: why do banks that make relationship loans finance themselves primarily with core deposits and when would it be optimal to finance such loans with purchased money? We show that not only are relationship loans informationally opaque and illiquid, but they also require the relationship between the bank and the borrower to endure in order for the bank to add value. However, the informational opacity of relationship loans gives rise to endogenous withdrawal risk that makes the bank fragile. Core deposits are an attractive funding source for such loans because the bank provides liquidity services to core depositors and this diminishes the likelihood of premature deposit withdrawal, thereby facilitating the continuity of relationship loans. That is, we show that banks will wish to match the highest value-added liabilities with the highest value-added loans and that doing so simultaneously minimizes the bank's fragility owing to withdrawal risk and maximizes the value the bank adds in relationship lending. We also examine the impact of interbank competition on the bank's asset-liability matching and extract numerous testable predictions. , Oxford University Press.