Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient?: Welfare and Existence in General Equilibrium
在标准阿罗-德布鲁经济中嵌入完全歧视垄断，发现无效率均衡，但证明若垄断品有成本则均衡有效，且自然垄断可用个性化两部定价。同时指出帕累托最优有时与剩余最大化冲突。
We examine the welfare properties of surplus maximization by embedding a perfectly discriminating monopoly in an otherwise standard Arrow-Debreu economy.Although we discover an inefficient equilibrium, we validate partial equilibrium intuition by showing: (i) that equilibria are efficient provided that the monopoly goods are costly, and (ii) that a natural monopoly can typically use personalized two-part tariffs in these equilibria.However, we find that Pareto optima are sometimes incompatible with surplus maximization, even when transfer payments are used.We provide insight into the source of this difficulty and give some instructive examples of economies where a second welfare theorem holds.