Shelf Registration and the Reduced Due Diligence Argument: Implications of the Underwriter Certification and the Implicit Insurance Hypotheses
检验了暂搁注册是否削弱承销商尽职调查的论点，发现承销商会为暂搁发行收取额外溢价，且溢价与预期尽职调查责任正相关，高责任企业更倾向传统注册。
Critics argue that shelf registration greatly reduces the ability of underwriters to perform adequate due diligence. This argument suggests underwriters will demand greater compensation for shelf issues compared to such traditional issues as an insurance premium for protection against potential litigation or loss of reputation caused by inadequate due diligence. Our findings suggest the presence of such a premium, that the premium is higher for firms with higher expected due diligence liabilities, and that underwriters perceive that shelf registration erodes due diligence and, subsequently, price the due diligence erosion accordingly. This pricing behavior is consistent with our findings that firms with higher expected due diligence liabilities are more likely to choose traditional registration.