Delistings, Controlling Shareholders and Firm Performance in Europe
利用欧洲数据，研究了控股股东在退市决策中的作用，发现控股股东将公司私有化时少数股东获得的异常回报较低，但控制公司特征后这一溢价消失，且退市后公司经营绩效未改善。
Abstract Using a novel European data set, we investigate the role of controlling shareholders in delisting decisions. Minority shareholders earn lower abnormal returns when the controlling shareholder takes the company private, but this lower premium disappears when we control for the firm's characteristics. After the delisting, firms delisted by their controlling shareholders do not improve their operating performance. These results do not suggest that controlling shareholders expropriate minority investors with minority freeze‐outs. Our findings are not due to heterogeneity across controlling shareholders. In fact, when we focus on family controlling shareholders, we find no evidence of performance improvement after the delisting.