Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification
研究代理成本对公司多元化的影响，发现管理层和外部大股东的持股比例与多元化程度负相关，而外部控制威胁、财务困境和管理层更替会促使公司减少多元化，表明代理问题导致公司维持价值减损的多元化策略。
ABSTRACT We provide evidence on the agency cost explanation for corporate diversification. We find that the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial equity ownership and to the equity ownership of outside blockholders. In addition, we report that decreases in diversification are associated with external corporate control threats, financial distress, and management turnover. These findings suggest that agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining value‐reducing diversification strategies and that the recent trend toward increased corporate focus is attributable to market disciplinary forces.